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• The Bank of Canada’s main projection
model, like any other model, is a
simpliﬁcation of a complex reality and
may not contain all the information that is
relevant for policy-makers. While it may
be desirable to keep the ﬁnancial elements
of the core projection model relatively
simple, there is theoretical and empirical
support for taking a broader range of
ﬁnancial variables into account. In the
presence of ﬁnancial frictions, ﬁnancing
costs will depend on the balance sheets of
borrowers, resulting in a credit channel
for the transmission of monetary policy.
• Models under development at the Bank
include ﬁnancial accelerators in which
changes in borrowers’ balance sheets play
an important role in cyclical ﬂuctuations
by affecting borrowers’ collateral and thus
their ability to access external ﬁnancing.
• These models are still at an early stage
of development, but the results to date
suggest that financial-accelerator
mechanisms have the potential to improve
policy advice and to help answer various
policy questions.
he Bank of Canada uses various strategies to
deal with uncertainty regarding future devel-
opments in the Canadian economy. Most
importantly, it considers a wide range of
information and analysis before making a monetary
policy decision and uses carefully articulated models
to produce economic projections and to examine alter-
native scenarios (Jenkins and Longworth 2002). Central
to the analysis presented to policy-makers at the Bank
is the staff economic projection for Canada from the
model ToTEM.1 Although any model is a simplification
of a complex reality and may not capture all the informa-
tion that is relevant for policy-makers, the staff projec-
tion provides the reference point from which the
implications of other sources of information are
assessed. To analyze information not considered in
ToTEM, staff at the Bank use other economic models
to assess the implications of this projection for policy.2
This article describes an ongoing research agenda at
the Bank to develop models in which financial variables
play an active role in the transmission of monetary
policy actions to economic activity. These models can
help analyze information from the ﬁnancial side of the
economy and provide an overall view of the implica-
tions of financial developments for the current economic
outlook. The article also explains how this research
can help address other fundamental issues related to
the objectives and conduct of monetary policy. One
example is how asset-price movements should be
taken into account in the monetary policy framework.
1.   For a discussion of ToTEM, see Fenton and Murchison (2006) in this issue.
2.   See Coletti and Murchison (2002).
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Why Should We Be Interested in
Financial Channels?
A primary purpose of the financial system is to allocate
savings to the most productive investments. In many
macroeconomic models, the ﬁnancial system is repre-
sented by a single interest rate that equates saving and
investment. While this abstraction is useful for some
purposes, it is also restrictive. Borrowing and lending
do not take place in perfect markets. Financial activi-
ties are complicated by frictions that arise from trans-
actions costs, asymmetric information, and the limited
enforceability of contracts. If information is asymmet-
ric, information such as the quality and outcome of an
investment project is known to the borrower, but lenders
can obtain this information only by incurring a moni-
toring or verification cost. In addition, a financial
contract requires considerable time and expense to
enforce. In the event that a contract is broken, it is
costly to reach a legal settlement. These frictions may
make lenders more reluctant to lend. As a result,
external funds may be more costly or less available
than in a model without ﬁnancial frictions.
Diverse financial arrangements have emerged to
reduce the high costs of monitoring and enforcement
faced by individual lenders and borrowers. To align
the incentives of borrower and lender, these arrange-
ments make the ﬁnancial position of the borrower an
important determinant of the cost of borrowing or the
availability of funds.3As a result, balance-sheet effects
play an important role in economic ﬂuctuations, a role
that is not present in more traditional macroeconomic
models.
There is also empirical evidence that balance-sheet
variables are important determinants of investment
andconsumptionexpenditures.Forexample,empirical
studies using ﬁrm-level data have provided evidence
that financial variables such as cash flow, leverage,
and other balance-sheet factors inﬂuence investment
spending (Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen 1988 and
subsequent work).4As well, small firms, which are often
believed to face greater ﬁnancing constraints, account
for a disproportionate share of the decline in manufac-
turing output and inventory demand after a change in
monetary policy (Gertler and Gilchrist 1994).
In the presence of frictions in the financial system,
financing costs will depend on the financial position
3.   For example, a lender may require collateral to back a loan to reduce the
likelihood that the borrower will default.
4.   See Ng and Schaller (1996); Chirinko and Schaller (2004); and Aivazian,
Ge, and Qiu (2005) for studies that consider Canadian ﬁrms.
of borrowers, giving rise to a credit channel for the
transmission of monetary policy (Bernanke and Gertler
1995). This means that lower interest rates can increase
real expenditures because they strengthen borrowers’
balance sheets and lower their costs of borrowing.
This feature of the economy is not captured by tradi-
tional models in which monetary policy affects aggre-
gate demand and inflation only through the interest
rate and exchange rate channels. Given the theoretical
and empirical support for taking ﬁnancial channels
into account, policy-makers should be interested in
modelswithmoredevelopedfinancialelementsin order
to better understand how their decisions will affect
economic activity.
In the presence of frictions in the
ﬁnancial system, ﬁnancing costs will
depend on the ﬁnancial position of
borrowers, giving rise to a credit
channel for the transmission of
monetary policy.
In addition, the importance of these ﬁnancial effects
could be episodic and could depend on the state of
the business cycle. Financial factors are particularly
important in explaining some of the biggest economic
downturns over the past 100 years. Bernanke (1983)
argues that a breakdown in ﬁnancial intermediation,
i.e., the funnelling of savings to investment, turned the
U.S. downturn of 1929–30 into the Great Depression.
Fisher (1933) highlights how the falling price level
drove up the real debt burden of borrowers during
this period. As well, many commentators have blamed
the protracted slump and deflation in Japan in the
1990sontheburstingoftherealestateandstockmarket
bubbles and the subsequent weakening of the financial
position of the banking system. Moreover, the U.S.
recession of the early 1990s generated much discussion
about whether a credit crunch had been brought about
by poorly capitalized banks. These problems may have
been worsened in some regions by a sharp decline in
commercial property prices. A better understanding
of the financial factors at play in such episodes is impor-
tant so that policy-makers can prevent their recurrence.
While policy-makers should be interested in ﬁnancial
channels, it may be a valid strategy to leave many of
them out of the core projection model. For example,35 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • AUTUMN 2006
financial channels might play a bigger role in some
periods than in others and may thus enter into monetary
policy decisions on an irregular basis. If so, the gain
from adding these channels may sometimes be out-
weighed by the cost of creating additional complexity
in the model. Nonetheless, separate models with bet-
ter-developed ﬁnancial channels can complement the
core model and reduce the risk of policy errors.
Contributing to Policy Analysis
Models with a richer financial sector can contribute
signiﬁcantly to the discussion on several policy issues
that central banks currently face. One example is that,
in recent years, housing prices have increased sharply
in several countries while household spending has
simultaneously been very strong. The higher housing
values have made a large pool of home equity available
to households, increasing their ability to borrow.5
Tapping into this home equity through, for example,
home-equity loans, has been an important channel of
support to household spending in recent years. In
Canada, the strong growth in home-equity lines of
credit (HELOCs) has coincided with the increase in
housing prices.6 U.S. survey data suggest that about
half of the home-financed borrowing was spent on
goods and services, while Canadian household micro-
data indicate that between 20 per cent and 50 per cent
of HELOCs are being used to finance current consump-
tion.7Modelling a richer ﬁnancial sector could help to
quantifythecontributionofthesebalance-sheeteffects
to household spending and housing-market activity.
Changes in the ﬁnancial system may also have impli-
cations for the appropriate setting for the stance of
monetary policy. Innovative ﬁnancial instruments or
lending practices may change the amount or type of
debt on borrowers’ balance sheets, with consequences
for the transmission mechanism of monetary policy.8
In this respect, financial factors are important for
5. Campbell and Cocco (2005) ﬁnd evidence in U.K. microdata that is consist-
ent with the argument that an increase in housing prices relaxes borrowing
constraints.
6. Debt outstanding on personal lines of credit has grown at an average rate
of 20 per cent per year since 1999, and about two-thirds of these credit lines
are secured by home equity. Some of this growth likely reﬂects substitution
for other forms of lending.
7.   See Greenspan and Kennedy (2005) for U.S. circumstances.
8.   Examples of such innovations include the use of credit scoring to make
screening of loan applicants more efﬁcient or the ability of ﬁnancial institu-
tions to securitize loans so that they can expand the sources of funds available
to lenders. Innovations in the ﬁnancial system tend to reduce frictions and
could bring an economy closer to the one approximated in ToTEM.
understanding how the economy is evolving and for
assessing the likely impact of monetary policy actions.
In addition, richer links between ﬁnancial and real
developments are critical for analyzing some key
questions related to the monetary policy framework.
How a central bank should respond to asset prices
depends on what role asset prices play in output and
inflation fluctuations and how movements in these
prices affect the functioning of the financial system
(see the discussion below). Other important questions
relate to the optimal level of inflation and the costs
and beneﬁts of inﬂation targeting versus price-level
targeting. The prevalence of nominal debt contracts,
both short and long term, together with bankruptcy
laws that affect the costs of default, should be an
important consideration in such analyses (see also
Howitt 2005).
Richer links between ﬁnancial and
real developments are critical for
analyzing some key questions related
to the monetary policy framework.
Finally, models with well-articulated links between the
ﬁnancial sector and the real economy will not only be
useful for monetary policy analysis, but also for ana-
lyzing questions related to ﬁnancial stability, another
topic of keen interest among central bankers. A good
grasp of how the financial system works is crucial when
considering the impact of a disruption to its normal
functioning.
Modelling Financial Channels
The most popular models for capturing financial
channels are referred to as financial accelerators. These are
models in which there is an explicit link between the
balance sheets of borrowers and their access to, or
cost of, external ﬁnancing.
One important strand of this research began with
Bernanke and Gertler (1989). In this model, there are
two key players: households, who are lenders, and
business owners/entrepreneurs, who are borrowers.
As well, there is asymmetric information between
borrowers and lenders, since lenders can only observe
the outcome of a borrower’s investment project at a
cost. Agency costs that arise from asymmetric infor-36 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • AUTUMN 2006
model that is otherwise fairly similar to ToTEM in
terms of the real side of the model. For example, prices
are sticky, allowing monetary policy to affect real varia-
bles in the short run. This strategy makes it possible to
assess the implications of financial channels for risks to
ToTEM’s analysis.
Our strategy is to start with the main
building blocks of DSGE models
created for policy analysis . . . and to
develop ﬁnancial elements within
those models.
Our work so far has followed that of Iacoviello (2005).9
In the model there are households who lend funds to
other households and to firm owners. The financial
friction takes the form of a problem of enforcing
repayment that leads lenders to require collateral.
Households also buy and sell housing, giving rise to a
housing market. Loan size is restricted to some fraction
of the value of a borrower’s real estate. This fraction
can be interpreted as the loan-to-value ratio that
features prominently in standard mortgages.
To illustrate some key features of the model, consider
a shock to the economy that leads to a rise in housing
prices. This increases the value of assets held by
households and the amount they can post as collateral.
Higher collateral values allow households to borrow
more, and these resources can be used to purchase
more housing and consumption. The accelerator effect
is present here because these extra expenditures drive
housing prices further up, reinforcing the rise in
collateral values and access to debt. Firm owners
also face a collateral constraint, but in their case, it
also affects their ability to invest.
One interesting feature of this model is that balance
sheets improve for all borrowers (households and
firms) during an upswing in economic activity. This
brings about widespread improvements in ﬁnancing
conditions that affect both households and ﬁrms at the
same time, suggesting there will be a stronger impact
9.   Our research is a work-in-progress, and here we provide some insights
from the work we have done so far and from Iacoviello (2005).
mation can drive the price of uncollateralized funds
above the cost of the ﬁrm’s internally generated funds.
In this setting, ﬁnancial position is a key determinant
of the credit conditions that a borrower faces. Speciﬁ-
cally, the net worth of a ﬁrm affects the premium that
must be paid for external sources of finance (funds
that come from sources outside the firm). In aggregate,
changes in the financial position of firms over the busi-
ness cycle drive a countercyclical risk premium on debt
that ampliﬁes ﬂuctuations in output and investment.
This chain of events is known as a financial-accelerator
mechanism because there are feedback effects between
the ﬁnancial position of the borrowers and the terms
of credit that can amplify business cycle ﬂuctuations.
For example, ﬁrm net worth deteriorates when a neg-
ative shock reduces cash flows and lowers the value
of its capital assets. As a result of the deterioration in
borrower balance sheets, the cost of ﬁnance rises, and
this depresses investment. This leads to a further fall
in the value of capital, which further reduces ﬁrm net
worth, reinforcing the increase in ﬁnancing costs and
further depressing investment.
An alternative way of capturing the financial-accelerator
mechanism is developed in the seminal work of
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). In this model, the ﬁnancial
frictionisanenforcementproblem;essentiallyborrowers
can default and never repay. The financial contract
that ensures repayment is one in which the quantity
of loans available is restricted to some fraction of the
value of the borrower’s collateral. In this case, it is the
quantity of external funds, rather than the cost, which
is related to the state of borrower balance sheets.
Many studies argue that the financial-accelerator
mechanism can amplify the effects of small shocks
(Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist 1999; Iacoviello 2005)
or can make their effects on real variables more persist-
ent (Carlstrom and Fuerst 1997). This suggests that
financial accelerators could be important for developing
more realistic business cycle dynamics in models for
policy analysis.
A Starting Point for Model
Development
Our strategy has been to start with the main building
blocks of dynamic stochastic general-equilibrium
(DSGE) models created for policy analysis at a number
of central banks and develop financial elements within
those models.
We introduce two financial accelerators, one that
applies to households, and the other to firms, into a37 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • AUTUMN 2006
on output, since both consumption and investment
spending will be affected.10
Another interesting insight from this model is that the
effects of the accelerator mechanisms on key macro
variables depend on the nature of the shock. One key
element of the model that generates these differential
impacts is that debt contracts are written in nominal
terms, as is the case in most real-world ﬁnancing rela-
tionships. If inﬂation is unexpectedly low over the life
of the loan, the debtor faces a cost of repayment that is
higher in real terms than was anticipated.11 Unexpected
price declines reduce debtors’ net worth and, as
a result, their capacity to borrow. The higher real
cost of debt repayment shifts funds from borrowers,
who have a high marginal propensity to consume, to
lenders (savers) who have a low propensity to con-
sume. The result is a reduction in aggregate demand.
The financial mechanisms in the model will therefore
amplify demand shocks, but dampen supply shocks. A
positive demand shock will raise output and inﬂation,
and the increase in inflation (albeit temporary under
inflation targeting) will reduce the real cost of debt
service, reinforcing the borrower’s ability to obtain
financing beyond what is available through the
standard accelerator mechanism. After a supply
shock that raises output and lowers inﬂation, the real
cost of debt repayment rises, reducing borrower net
worth and dampening part of the rise in output.
In order to better understand these ﬁnancial-accelera-
tor mechanisms, two Bank of Canada working papers
(Christensen and Dib 2006; Gammoudi and Mendes,
forthcoming) consider the impact of the business and
household accelerators in isolation. Christensen and Dib
(2006) estimate a model very similar to that of Bern-
anke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) in which firms must
borrow to purchase capital and pay a premium on
external funds. Their results suggest that this mecha-
nism can help to capture the co-movement in output,
inﬂation, and investment. They also show that the
financial accelerator ampliﬁes investment ﬂuctua-
tions, but may dampen consumption movements.
This dampening may happen, for example, because
households (the ultimate source of funds) will
reduce consumption and save more to take advantage
oftemporarilyhigherinvestmentreturnsandthelower
10.   The net impact will depend on the behaviour of those who supply the sav-
ings in this model economy. For example, it is likely that a positive shock that is
expected to be temporary will induce savers to lend more in the short term.
11.   This is the mechanism highlighted in Fisher’s (1933) famous paper on
debt and deﬂation.
risk associated with loans to firms. For some types
of shocks this means that the financial-accelerator
mechanism has had little impact on output or inflation—
the variables of ultimate interest to policy-makers.
Gammoudi and Mendes (forthcoming) develop a
model with lending and borrowing households. Bor-
rowing households in this model face a collateral con-
straint based on the work of Iacoviello (2005). One key
ﬁnding is that the model is better able to capture the
correlation between housing prices and consumption
than a model without the borrowing constraint. In
both of these studies, financial accelerators play an
important role in capturing the co-movement in key
variables of interest. Results from the integrated model
under development suggest that including ﬁnancial
accelerators in both the business and household sectors
can lead to a stronger impact on output, under certain
types of shocks, than when financial accelerators
are restricted to operating in only one sector, as in
the two studies discussed here.
The impact of the ﬁnancial-
accelerator mechanisms . . . will
depend on the nature of the shock,
showing that such a model could
provide a useful alternative
interpretation of recent data.
Research to date suggests that ﬁnancial-accelerator
mechanisms have the potential to provide useful
insights for policy deliberations. The impact of these
mechanisms on key macroeconomic variables can be
important and will depend on the nature of the shock
hitting the economy. This suggests that these models
may provide a better-informed view of what eco-
nomic forces have been at play over history. In the pol-
icy arena, such a model could provide a useful
alternative interpretation of recent data and could
guide policy decisions about how economic events
will unfold over the forecast horizon.
Towards a More Complete Analysis
of Financial Channels
The quantitative importance of financial frictions is
still the subject of much debate. Some have argued
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above are unlikely to play a signiﬁcant role in business
cycle ﬂuctuations. Kocherlakota (2000) and Cordoba
and Ripoll (2004), for example, find that the amplifica-
tion of shocks produced by borrowing constraints
may be important only under relatively restrictive
assumptions.  Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2006)
argue that how financial frictions are modelled is critical
to a model’s usefulness in explaining business cycle
ﬂuctuations. The issues these authors raise suggest
that there is fertile ground for future research in this
area, particularly in exploring the role these mechanisms
play in different types of models and in assessing their
ability to capture key features of macroeconomic data.
There is also a need to ﬂesh out the mechanisms at
play in ﬁnancial-accelerator models to better reﬂect
the characteristics of real world ﬁnancial markets.  In
the work described above, there is no formal distinction
between ﬁnancial institutions and ﬁnancial markets.
This distinction could well be important, however,
since bank balance-sheet conditions can influence the
ability of borrowers to access credit. As well, the
effects of the ﬁnancial accelerator could be altered
if ﬁrms are able to access alternative sources of
financing, such as bonds and equity. Below, we dis-
cuss some areas for additional research.
Bank capital channel
The models discussed above abstract completely from
the role of bank capital (i.e., bank net worth and bank
equity) in the monetary policy transmission mechanism.
This omission is particularly unfortunate given the
strong empirical evidence in support of the role of
banks’ financial structure in lending decisions and
their importance for macroeconomic stability (Peek
and Rosengren 1995, 1997). Researchers at the Bank of
Canada and elsewhere have studied the importance
of bank capital for the amplification and propagation of
shocks. This work presents another financial-accel-
erator mechanism where the endogenous evolution of
bank capital and its interplay with entrepreneur net
worth (and asset prices) propagate the effects of mon-
etary policy to the real economy.
Meh and Moran (2004) and Sunirand (2002) develop
dynamic general-equilibrium models that study the
link between the evolution of bank capital and entre-
preneur net worth on the one hand, and monetary
policy and economic activity on the other. These models
feature two sources of asymmetric information. The
first comes from the relationship between banks and
their borrowers (firms), where firms can choose to
undertake riskier projects or not to report truthfully
their production in order to enjoy unobservable private
benefits. To mitigate this problem, banks require
entrepreneurs to invest their own net worth in the
projects. This channel, where the ability of firms to
borrow depends on their ﬁnancial position, has been
emphasized by most ﬁnancial-accelerator models, as
discussed above (see Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist
1999). The second source comes from the relationship
between banks and their own source of funds (deposi-
tors or investors) where banks, to which depositors
delegate the monitoring of firms, may not do an
adequate job because monitoring is costly. In response,
investors demand that banks invest their own net
worth—bank capital—in the financing of projects.
Thus, the available funds that banks can attract from
investors to lend to ﬁrms are limited by the amount of
bank capital.
Multiple sources of external ﬁnance
In all the models discussed so far, it is assumed, for
simplicity, that only a single source of external funds—
debt financing—is available to firms or banks. In prac-
tice, most firms raise external funds from multiple
sources,suchasmarketabledebt,bankloans,orequity.
Using data on U.S. ﬁrms from the Compustat data set,
Covas and den Haan (forthcoming) ﬁnd that debt and
equity issuances are procyclical for most firms. They
then construct a DSGE model where ﬁrms can have
access to two sources of external financing for
investment: debt financing and equity financing. In
such a model, the net worth of the firm is not only
increased through retained earnings (as assumed in the
previous models) but also by issuing equity. Another
important feature of the model is its heterogeneity in
terms of ﬁrm size, where small firms are much more
likely to rely on equity financing while large firms
tend to use more debt ﬁnancing. A calibrated version
of their model shows that the presence of equity
financing substantially contributes to the perform-
ance of ﬁnancial-accelerator models. More speciﬁcally,
after a positive productivity shock, output increases
more in the model with debt and equity ﬁnancing
than in the model with only debt ﬁnancing.
Similarly, Jermann and Quadrini (2006) consider a
model in which firms finance production with both
debt and equity. In addition, business cycle fluctuations
are driven by asset-price shocks that are propagated
to the real economy through ﬁnancial frictions. They
show that financial innovations that improve the ability
to borrow and issue equity allow ﬁrms to adjust more
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in financing arrangements leads to greater volatility
in the ﬁnancial structure of ﬁrms, but also lowers the
volatility of output in response to shocks to asset prices.
Determination of asset prices
An important characteristic in models with ﬁnancial
frictions (like the one  described on pp. 34–35) is
that movements in asset prices affect the ability of
firms or households to borrow. So the model is a
natural laboratory to address key policy questions,
such as how monetary policy should react to asset-
price shocks. To address such questions, it is important
to have a model that links asset-price movements to
the real economy and inﬂation.
Bank researchers Basant-Roi and Mendes (forthcoming)
develop a model in which households face an external
financing premium similar to that in Bernanke, Ger-
tler, and Gilchrist (1999). The authors use this model
to analyze how the ﬁnancial accelerator interacts with
a housing-price bubble (defined as a sustained and
growing deviation of housing prices from their fun-
damental levels) to affect the optimal horizon over
which monetary authorities should bring inﬂation
back to target. They ﬁnd that a housing-price bubble
lengthens the optimal horizon appreciably.12 In their
work, and in many other models, bubbles are exoge-
12.   For a summary of this and related work, see Coletti, Selody, and Wilkins
(2006).
nous and are therefore unaffected by monetary pol-
icy actions. A challenge for future work is to
develop quantitative models in which large changes
in asset prices are endogenous to developments else-
where in the economy. Researchers at the Bank of Can-
ada and elsewhere have started such work (Caballero
andKrishnamurthy2006;Ríos-RullandSánchez-Marcos
2006; and Tomura, forthcoming).
Conclusions
In this article, we present a research agenda on
developing models of ﬁnancial channels for monetary
policy analysis at the Bank of Canada and discuss the
progress we have made so far. This research is particu-
larlyrelevantgivenrecent ﬁnancialdevelopmentsand
substantial fluctuations in asset prices. Current progress
in DSGE modelling and research on ﬁnancial frictions
suggests that this line of research could lead to a better
understanding of the role of credit and ﬁnancial varia-
bles in the monetary policy transmission mechanism.
Many challenges remain, however, in modelling the
financial and real linkages, and various ways to improve
the current research are being considered. The progress
we have made to date suggests that these models
shouldimprovepolicyadviceandarecapableofhelping
to answer different policy questions. This is important
for policy-makers, because “looking at the economy
through a variety of lenses leads to more comprehensive
rigorous analyses” (Macklem 2002).
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